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Cohn: Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corporation: An Analysis

CARNERO V. BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION: AN
ANALYSIS
Daniel Allen Cohn*

INTRODUCTION
Circuit Court's refusal to extend Section 806 whistleblower protection to
employees of publicly-traded American businesses operating abroad
undermines the effectiveness of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct

On January 7, 2004, Ruben Camero ("Carnero") filed a complaint in
United States District Court alleging that his employment with a Latin
American subsidiary of Boston Scientific Corp. ("BSC") had been terminated in
retaliation for "whistleblowing."' l Camero had informed BSC that the subsidiary
inflated sales figures and created false invoices. 2 The district court determined
that Carnero, an Argentinean citizen, residing in Brazil, could not sue BSC
under the "whistleblower protection provision" contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 20023 as the provision is without extraterritorial effect.4 The U.S. Court

*

J.D. Candidate 2008, Hofstra University School of Law. I would like to thank my parents, Dr.

Mitchell and Barbara Cohn, for their unending love and patience, Ms. Dana Avidan, for her
invaluable support and inspiration, and the editorial staff of the Hofstra Journal of International
Business & Law, who significantly contributed to the development of this article.
1 Carnero v. Boston Sci. Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1" Cir. 2006) (In accordance with the procedural
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower statute, Carnero first sought a judgment from the
Department of Labor. It was the Department of Labor that initially concluded that (a) Boston
Scientific Corp. was covered by the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision- because it is a
publicly traded company on the New York Stock Exchange, and (b) that "the whistleblower
protection provision of the Act did not apply to employees of covered companies working outside of
the United States." The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts then engaged
in a de novo judicial review of these findings on January 7, 2004 when Carnero filed a complaint in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(I)(B), providing that claimant may bring federal court
action if the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision within 180 days of filing the
complaint and if there is no showing that the delay is due to the claimant's bad faith); SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
2 id.
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tit. VIII, § 806 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 1514A);
Carnero,433 F.3d at 2.
4 Carnero,433 F.3d at 1.
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of Appeals for the Is'circuit affirmed the judgment, 5 and Camero's petition for
a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied in June of 2006.6
The Court began by taking Camero's satisfaction of the statute's basic
elements as a given 7- and further, acknowledged that the whistleblower
protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act extends to alleged retaliation
against an employee of a subsidiary of a publicly traded domestic company. 8
Nevertheless, the court concluded that Carnero was not entitled to
whistleblower protection because Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does
not expressly indicate extraterritorial application. 9 Therefore, even though BSC
was covered by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (as a publicly traded company on the
New York Stock Exchange), and subject to its provisions, the Court concluded
that Section 806 "would not apply to employees of covered companies working
outside of the United States."10 In formulating this interpretation, the court
considered the text, structure, context and legislative history of the statute in
order to uncover the nature of Congress's intended application.''
This case note will examine the 1 s' Circuit's decision in Carnero v.
Boston Scientific Corp., holding the "whistleblower protection provision" of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to be without extraterritorial application. What follows, is a
recapitulation of the methodology used, and an evaluation of the conclusions
drawn, by the Court, in surmising congressional intent regarding the
whistleblower provision housed in Section 806. This note will then briefly take
stock of the legal precedent set by Carnero, and how it has been utilized in
recent cases. Finally, the note will conclude with a discussion of the likely
policy repercussions of the Carneroholding and its ultimate imprudence.
THE COURT'S RATIONALE
The Court in Carnero uses a traditional canon of statutory
interpretation as the essential foundation for its rationale in limiting Section 806
to domestic application. 12 Citing the language of an important 1949 Supreme
Court decision in Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, the Carnero court

5 id.
6 Carnero v. Boston Sci. Corp., cert. denied, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4956 (U.S., June 26, 2006) (mem.).
' See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a)
8 Carnero,433 F.3d at 6.

9 Id. at 7 (Here, the Court employs a canon of statutory construction set forth in Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949)).
1oId. at 3 (citing Camero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 2004-SOX-22 (OSHA Reg'l Adm'r) (Dec. 19,
2003)).
11Id.

12 See Id. at 3.
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declares "it is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 13 Since Congress does not explicitly
state that Section 806 is to be applied extraterritorially and because no contrary
intent seems detectable, the Court concludes that the provision ought to be
constricted to domestic application.' 4 Moreover, the Court finds that the
strength of this "Foley-presumption"' 15 offsets 6whatever value overseas
application of Section 806 would have for investors.'
In searching for a manifestation of congressional intent beyond the
plain-language of Section 806, the Court looks to the context and legislative
history of the statute. 17 It finds that other provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley, as well
as unrelated statutes, clearly evince Congress's consideration of extraterritorial
application, whereas no such lucid indication appears in Section 806.18
Furthermore, by placing the responsibility of enforcement in the hands of the
Department of Labor ("DOL"), a domestic agency, Congress has shown a lack
of concern for the problems that would arise should that agency seek to regulate
employment relationships abroad. 19 For the Court, these considerations
(or lack
20
thereof) buttress its initial presumption against extraterritoriality.

Camero,433 F.3d at 3.
id.
'5 The question of whether "contrary intent appears," is an integral part of the rule set forth in
13
14

Foley. Indeed, the presumption itself is conditioned upon the Court's inability to find evidence of
such intent. Where this note refers to the Foley-presumption, it means only the presumption itself,
and not the rule as a whole.
16 Camero, 433 F.3d at 7 ("In the present case, whatever help to investors its overseas application
might in theory provide is offset ...
by the absence of any indication that Congress contemplated
extraterritoriality..." The Court seems to have concluded here that the strength of the Foleypresumption outweighs, in a sort of balancing test, whatever value would derive from protection of
foreign whistleblowers under Section 806. This is a highly contentious point, and one which lies at
the crux of the decision, and its imprudence. As will be discussed further in this note, the facts of
Foley so drastically differ from Carnero, that the presumption, whatever its value, is misplaced here.
Moreover, the value that extraterritorial application of Section 806 would provide investors is, in
fact, profound; and underappreciated by the Court in Carnero. This important point will also be
examined more closely as the note proceeds.).
I7 at 8.
Id.
'8 Id. ("Not only is the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1514A silent as to any intent to apply abroad, the
statute's legislative history indicates that Congress gave no consideration to either the possibility or
the problems of overseas application. In sharp contrast with this silence, Congress has provided
expressly elsewhere in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for extraterritorial enforcement of a different,
criminal, whistleblower statute. By so providing, Congress demonstrated that it was well able to call
for extraterritorial application when it so desired.").
'9Id. at 9.
20 Id. ("Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
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The mechanics of the Carnero court's statutory interpretation seem
appropriate, but the substance of its inspection is lacking. The Court first looks
to the plain language of Section 806 and concludes, properly, that it makes no
mention of territorial application. 21 As such, the Court finds that there exists a
presumption against any congressional intention to enforce the provision
abroad.22 The Court then proceeds to consider the context of Section 806, in
search of "contrary intent" that would effectively rebut 24the presumption it has
adopted. 23 It finds no such intent on the part of Congress.
It is still an accepted maxim of statutory interpretation, that absent
plain language to the contrary, legislation of Congress is presumed to apply
only domestically. 25 However, this presumption does not apply where the
legislation pertains to concerns that are not inherently domestic.26 As will be
explicated as this note proceeds, Section 806 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself
are an effort to protect the American securities market, and its investors, from
fraudulent financial activity- both at home and abroad.27 This fact ought to
have rendered the Court's initial presumption inapplicable.
Furthermore, the Court engages in an unprogressive investigation of
contrary intent- which would rebut the presumption it mistakenly adopted. In
proceeding to make its contextual considerations, the Court really remains
transfixed by the lack of any plain language specifying the extraterritorial
applicability of Section 806. With the exception of it's concerns regarding the
DOL,the Court refuses to divert it's attention from the text itself to consider the
statute's broader context. This failure to adequately explore other indicia of
congressional intent, particularly the environment surrounding the SarbanesOxley Act itself and the substantial value the Section 806 provision has

another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983); "No reference is made to providing for interpreters, for coordinating with the Department of
State, or for the utilization of foreign personnel. Significantly, the DOL is given only sixty days to
complete its entire investigation of a complaint and to issue findings under the procedure mandated
by 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(A). This short time frame seems unrealistic if the DOL were expected
to conduct investigations overseas. Moreover, if an administrative hearing is held, the hearing 'shall
be conducted expeditiously' under 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(A). There is no provision either for the
resources or the flexibility that might be needed in dealing with foreign matters.").
21 Carnero, 433 F.3d at 7.
22 id.
23 id.
24 Id. at 8.

25See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
26United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
27See Bechtel v. Competitive Technologies, Inc. 448 F.3d 469, 484 (2,d Cir. 2006) (Straub, J.
dissenting).
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regarding its application, leads to an unsatisfactory judicial conclusion.
Of paramount concern is that the Foley-presumption is misplaced.
There are essential differences in both areas of the law and the politics at issue
between 1949 Foley, and here, in 2006 Carnero- which the First Circuit failed
to recognize. 28 Such oversight led to a holding that is contrary to the goals of
Congress and which undermines the effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Furthermore, in its contextual investigation for "contrary intent," the court fails
to give adequate weight to the overarching context of the Act, and the
mechanisms in place to further its ends. It places superior emphasis on the
context of Section 806, as it appears within the confines of Sarbanes-Oxley, and
undermines the essential legal and political circumstances under which
Sarbanes-Oxley, itself, was enacted. The contextual arguments made by the
Court seem purposed toward supporting it's initial conclusion that the Foleypresumption apply.
Indeed, the limited scope of this investigation reflects an essential bias
toward substantiating a conclusion the Court has already drawn. Had the
Carnerocourt recognized the important differences between Foley and the case
before it, and avoided so abruptly applying the precedent set forth in the former
case, it would have probably engaged in a more full-bodied and impartial
analysis of the context of Section 806. Such consideration would have revealed
the intention and importance of providing whistleblower protection to
29
employees of American companies operating beyond our borders.
A. The Difference with Foley: Misplaced Presumption
The Foley case concerned the applicability of the Eight Hour Law30 to
a contract between the United States and a private contractor it had hired to
work on construction projects in Iraq and Iran. 31 The Eight Hour Law provides
that every contract made, to which the United States is a party, shall contain a
provision that no laborer doing any part of the work contemplated by the
contract, in the employ of the contractor or any subcontractor, shall be required
or permitted to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day without
specific restitution.32
28

Examples of these differences will be dealt with in greater specificity as the note proceeds, but in

this instance it refers to the difference between labor law and securities law, as well as, the great
progressions in global economics with regard to interconnectedness.
29 As will be later revealed in greater detail, it is the position of the author that Section 806
whistleblower protection ought to be provided to all employees of companies subject to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act- not just those individuals employed by American corporations.
'0 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 321-326 (2007).
31 Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
32Id. at 283 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 324 (2007); 40 U.S.C § 325(a) (2007)).
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In 1941, Foley Bros., Inc. contracted with the United States to build
certain public works in the Middle East. 33 When Foley Bros. failed to
compensate one of its employees, in accordance with the provisions of the Eight
Hour Law, the employee filed suit to recover his unpaid wages. 34 The case
made its way up through the New York State Courts before the U.S. Supreme
Court granted a Writ of Certiorari; and considered whether Congress intended
to extend the Eight Hour Law to work performed in foreign countries.35 It
concluded that no such intent existed.36
The Foley court begins its investigation of congressional intent by
recognizing that, unless a contrary intent appears, legislation of Congress is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 37 So,
even though the Carnero court uses the Foley decision as the backbone of its
presumption against extraterritoriality, it must be noted that the Foley case did
not establish that maxim of interpretation. 38
The Foley court references the language of the Supreme Court in
Blackmer v. United States which, in turn, refers back to an earlier decision in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co..39 The American Banana holding of
1909 was probably the first to clearly establish the presumption that when
Congress legislates, it intends to restrict its laws to domestic application. 40 The
Carnero court's decision to reference Foley, and not American Banana (or its
closer progeny4 ), is important because it reflects the Court's conception of
Section 806 in terms of employment, and not in terms of market security.42 This
distinction is of the utmost importance, as the presumption is probably not
applicable to cases of the later sort.43
American Banana dealt with the applicability of the Sherman AntiTrust Act to conduct beyond the territorial limits of the United States. There, the
Plaintiff, a domestic corporation, asserted that Defendant, its competitor and

33

Id.

34 id.
31 Id. at 284.
36

Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.

37 Id. (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932)).

38See Blackmer v. U.S., 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U. S.347, 357 (1909).
39 Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.
40 See American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357
41 Such as Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 370 U.S. 690 (1962); which, like
American Banana, also dealt with the territorial scope of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
42 The Foley Bros. case dealt with foreign application of the Eight Hour Law, whereas the
American Banana case concerned enforcement of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act abroad.
43 See Continental Ore, 370 U.S. at 704-705.
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also a domestic corporation, had engaged in monopolistic practices in Panama 4
which were forbidden by the Act. 45 The Supreme Court held that it would not
apply the Sherman Anti-Trust provisions extraterritorially. 46
The Court concluded that "the general and almost universal rule is that
the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the
law of the country where the act is done.47 For another jurisdiction, if it should
happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather
than those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but
would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the
' 48
comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.
Further, the Court declared that "all legislation is prima facie territorial. 49
The presumption set forth in American Banana, and referenced by the
Foley court50 (as well as countless others over the last century) still has
precedential value. 5' But, in the realm of international relations and the laws
that govern those relations, much has changed since 1909. American Banana,
itself, has been overturned5 2 by Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp. In that case, the Supreme Court held that "a conspiracy to
monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States is
not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct
complained of occurs in foreign countries. ' 3
That decision, as well as others that have followed suit, recognize the
increasing interconnectedness of Nations, particularly with regard to
economics.5 4 In 1909, America's interest in regulating business operations

44 American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357 (at the time of the contentious actions, a border dispute

existed between Panama and Costa Rica. Let it suffice to say that the defendant was operating in
one of these two nations, clearly beyond the borders of the United States).
45 Id. (defendant had intentionally manipulated shipping routes and trade agreement to favor its own
interests. There was no question that such action, had it taken place inside the borders of the United
States would have been illegal.).
46 id.
47

Id.

41 Id. at 357.
49 Id.

'oFoley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285 (citing to Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437; which in turn cites to
American Banana, 213 U.S. 347).
51 See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
52 ContinentalOre, 370 U.S. at 704-705.
53 See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. Pacific &
Arctic R. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268
(1927).
54 See Harford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (holding that notions of comity do
not require that foreign insurers be granted jurisdictional immunity from the Sherman Act). See also
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abroad was minimal. Such conduct simply did not have a substantial enough
effect on our economy to warrant proscribing applicable laws abroad. Doing so
would have been insulting to the sovereignty of other States, and would violate
our nation's duty of comity toward them. But, as courts and nations have begun
to recognize, this is no longer the case. Indeed, the notion that a State may
properly proscribe law to actions beyond its borders which have a substantial
effect within its territory has been well-established both domestically and
among the States. This accepted rule of international law is known as the
"effects principle," and has become a recognized element of comity among
56
Nations.
The Carnero court conceives of Section 806 in terms of employment
law- a traditionally domestic legal realm with minimal international influence.
This is why the Court references Foley, and subscribes to the presumption
against extraterritoriality adopted therein. But, unlike the Eight Hour Law at
issue there, failure to apply Section 806 extraterritorially risks imposing and
restricting the commerce of the United States. As such, Carnero fits more
properly into the lineage of American Banana and Continental Ore; where the
important exception to the presumption against extraterritorial application of
laws has been duly recognized.57
At the heart of the Foley decision was the Court's conclusion that it is
not the intention of the American legislature to overthrow the labor law
provisions of other nations, regardless of how dissimilar such foreign
conceptions of proper employment may be from our own.58 It held that the
nature of labor and employment rights is principally a domestic matter.59 To
enforce our Eight Hour Law (and its embodiment of our own conceptions of
just employment) abroad
would be an inappropriate intrusion on the sovereignty
60
of foreign nations.
Certainly, the aforementioned logic of the Foley court is sound. It
would be wholly inappropriate, and profoundly poor politics, for America to
force its laws on other nations where the action sought to be regulated has no
direct bearing domestically. 61 The manner in which Iran chooses to conduct its

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
55 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 401, 403 (1987).
56 STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW (Aspen Pub. Co.

2000).

57 ContinentalOre, 370 U.S. at 705.

58Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286.
59 id.

6 id.
61 See U.S. v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1176 (Hawaii 2000) ("For most legislation, the presumption
against extraterritoriality makes perfect sense. First, 'Congress generally legislates with domestic
concerns in mind,' Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n. 5, (1993), so courts can infer from
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domestic labor environment is of no concern to the United States. As such,
reason dictates that absent a clear expression to the contrary, our labor laws
must reasonably be interpreted to have no effect upon Iranian employment. But,
unlike the Eight Hour Law at issue in Foley, Section 806 is not really about
labor and employment law. It is about securities law and the protection of
American market integrity.
In 2002 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in direct response to
a wave of financial scandals that undermined the dependability of the American
securities market. 62 Revelations of mass corporate fraud, most notably the
Enron and WorldCom scandals, threatened to destroy investors' faith in the
American financial markets and, in so doing, to jeopardize those markets and
the American economy. 6 3 To combat this threat, Congress passed a large body
of reporting regulations and oversight provisions, intended as tools to ferret out
financial deceit on the part of publicly traded corporations. But Congress also
tools to work, the law would have to
recognized that in order for any of these
64
retaliation.
from
whistleblowers
protect
Enron Corporation's deceptive actions had cost its investors hundreds
of millions of dollars by the time insider Sherron Watkins stepped forward and
"blew the whistle" on its fraudulent practices.65 The corporate deceit at
WorldCom Inc. had taken a similar financial toll on investors when Cynthia
66
Cooper pointed out the fraud that had been perpetuated by her employer.
Indeed, whistleblowers like Watkins and Cooper are responsible for bringing to
light the very scandals that birthed the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.
Congress recognized the substantial value of protecting such
individuals, and encouraging their actions. In order for the regulations and
reporting provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley to take effect, methods of enforcement
must be in place. Section 806 was passed into law because Congress recognized
congressional silence that the legislature meant to regulate only activities within the nation's
borders. Second, the rule ensures that we do not precipitate 'unintended clashes between our laws
and those of other nations which could result in international discord.' EEOC v. ARAMCO, 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991). The Supreme Court has invoked this territorial presumption in numerous
cases involving the scope of broad regulatory statutes. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
Inc. 509 U.S. 155, 173 (1993) (Immigration and Nationality Act); Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (Title
VII); Filardo,336 U.S. at 285 (federal overtime law); American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357 (Sherman
Act)").
62Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 2006 WL 2772695 at *3 (D. Conn., Sept. 25, 2006).
63 Id.

64 Id. (citing S.Rep. No. 107-146, at 10 (2002), "Often, in complex fraud prosecutions, insiders are

the only firsthand witnesses to the fraud.").
65 John Gibeaut, Culture Clash: Other Countries Don't Embrace Sarbanes or America's Reverence
of Whistleblowers, 92-MAY A.B.A. J. 10 (May 2006).
66id.
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two important truths: First, that corporate insiders are in the best (and often the
only) position to uncover and witness corporate fraud; and second, that these
insiders will be far more likely to report their discovery
if they are assured that
67
the law will provide them with financial protection.
The Carnero court does not challenge the fact that the vast reporting
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are intended by Congress to apply to any
corporation, foreign or domestic, that chooses to list its securities on American
exchanges.68 Such a truth has been obvious to both the courts and corporations
that have encountered the Act. Yet, in Carnero, Congress's intention to make
use of the single most important tool of effectively ensuring compliance with
these provisions70is questioned. 69 And the Vs Circuit has concluded that no such
intention exists.
The Carnero court seems to have decided that even though Congress
intended for BSC to comply with the reporting procedures set forth in SarbanesOxley, and to abstain from fraudulent accounting, it also found the cost of
incidental infringement on employment relations abroad to be too high a
political price of enforcement. This rationale simply does not follow from legal
precedent, or from the context and history of Section 806 and Sarbanes-Oxley.
To apply the Eight Hour Law in Foley extraterritorially would have
been to impose American values of individual rights, abroad, as ends in
themselves. It would have, without legitimate concern for our nation's own
well-being, mandated that our laws usurp the laws of Iran- and in so doing,
belittle that nation's sovereignty. Alternatively, application of Section 806 to
corporate operations abroad would serve only as a means to an end: to protect
the American securities market by encouraging whistleblowers to report fraud
that may substantially damage it. Thus, whatever infringement upon foreign
labor and employment law that would follow from extraterritorial application of
Section 806, would be the result of a legitimate domestic concern.
Indeed, the Foley court points out that the presumption against
extraterritoriality "is based on the assumption that Congress is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions.'
While enforcement of the Eight Hour
Law abroad would have almost no effect on such domestic conditions,
application of Section 806 certainly would. As international commerce
continues to grow, the effect that foreign business operations have on the

67
68

See Guyden, 2006 WL 2772695 at *3.
Carnero, 433 F.3d at 3.

69Id. at 4.
70 Id. at 18.
71 Foley, 336 U.S. at

285.
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American economy becomes increasingly profound.72 This is precisely why all
publicly traded companies, both foreign and domestic, have been made subjects
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Section 806 is a key tool in ensuring the
effectiveness of the provisions contained therein.73 Failure to apply its
protections extraterritorially creates a serious risk of non-compliance abroad,
and thus, financial injury at home.
The presumption against extraterritorial application is "based on the
common-sense inference that, where Congress does not indicate otherwise,
legislation dealing with domestic matters is not meant to extend beyond the
nation's borders. 4 But the presumption does not apply where the legislation
implicates concerns that are not inherently domestic. 75
In United States v. Bowman, the Supreme Court held that the
presumption against extraterritorial application of our laws does not govern the
interpretation of statutes that, by their nature, implicate the legitimate interests
of the U.S. abroad. The Bowman case concerned a fraud perpetuated upon a
U.S. vessel, outside the territorial waters of the U.S. 76 Although the statute at
issue there did not contain an extraterritoriality provision, the Court concluded
that it covered the conduct in question.77 If fraud against a single American ship
operating abroad has an effect on domestic interests substantial enough to rebut
the presumption against extraterritorial application of our laws, then surely the
domestic interest in ensuring the propriety of foreign business operations having
a multi-billion dollar presence in our markets78 provides a rationale for
extraterritorial application of Section 806 that is equally, if not much more,
compelling.79

See www.aftermarket.org/International/Foreign-Market-Reports/APAC99.pdf
73 Guyden, 2006 WL 2772695 at *3.
74 Corey, 232 F.3d at 1170.
72

75 id.

76 U.S. v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
77 Corey, 232 F.3d at 1170. (See also U.S. v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839 n.4 (applying
Bowman to violent crimes associated with international drug trafficking); U.S v. Felix-Gutierrez,
940 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Bowman to accessory after the fact to the murder of a
DEA agent in Mexico)).
78 See Automotive Aftermarket Industry Association (AAIA), Foreign Market Reports, available at
http://www.aftermarket.org/intemational/foreign-market-eports/foreign-market-reports.asp#APA
C (last visited April 25, 2007).
79 Carnerodid expressly refer the Court to the decisions in Bowman, and Shoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) (where civil antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act were given
extraterritorial application to protect American investors who purchase foreign securities on
American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities). The Court simply found the other factors- namely;
the absence of any plain language to contradict the Foley-presumption, the decision to give the
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The purpose of applying whistleblower protection abroad has almost
nothing to do with America imposing its labor and employment values on other
countries, and everything to do with America protecting its legitimate interest in
the integrity of its own domestic securities markets. The latter is a compelling
and justifiable reason for extraterritorial application of Section 806- one which
was wholly absent from the Eight Hour Law at issue in Foley, and which, given
the Supreme Court decisions in Bowman and Continental Ore, effectively
rebuts the presumption used therein.
B. The Court's Supplementary Contextual Considerations Are Inadequate
Once the Carnerocourt adopts the Foley-presumption, it proceeds by80
considering whether or not Congress manifested a "clear intent" to rebut it.
Such an investigation involves the Court's contextual consideration of Section
806. First, the Court takes into account the structural discrepancies between81
Section 806 and other related (as well as unrelated) Sarbanes-Oxley statutes.
The fact that other provisions have expressly called for extraterritorial
application, whereas Section 806 has not, demonstrates to the Carnero court
that the presumption was meant to remain intact. 82 Furthermore, the Court finds
that this point gains increased support upon consideration of the enforcement
context surrounding Section 806. Since the DOL is a domestic body and illequipped to deal with the enforcement problems likely to arise in an
international setting, the Court finds it most likely that Congress
intended to
83
limit enforcement (and application) of Section 806 domestically.
In contrast to Section 806, which makes no express reference to
foreign entities, Section 106 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act deals directly with
foreign accounting firms. 84 That provision requires such firms to register with
the SEC 85 if they audit public companies. 86 It also carves out exceptions that are
tailored to difficulties inherent in American regulation of overseas
professionals. 8 7 The Court finds that this accounting provision "reflects

Department of Labor enforcement responsibility, and the fact that other provisions did expressly
indicate congressional intention of application abroad, to be greater indications of Section 806's
territorial scope.
80 Camero, 433 F.3d at 8.
8I

Id.

See id. at 8.
83Id.
52

id. at 9.
85
86
87

The firms are technically required to register with a Board appointed by the SEC.
Camero, 433 F.3d at 9.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7216(c), providing that the SEC or the Board may, as it 'determines

necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors,' exempt a foreign
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Congress's recognition that the application of domestic U.S. regulatory statutes
domestic
to persons abroad presents problems in addition to those of purely
8s
application, and of the need to address those problems specifically.
In drawing this comparison between the Sarbanes-Oxley accounting
provision and the Section 806 whistleblower protection provision, the Court
clearly establishes that, in drafting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress was
mindful of its overseas application (and the problems which may arise there
from). This seems, at least on its face, to suggest that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is
a body of legislation Congress intended to have an international personalityand indeed it is.
However, rather than placing contextual emphasis on the Act itself, the
events which brought it about and the ends it sought to realize, the Court
focuses its attention on Section 806 as it compares to other provisions within the
confines of the Act. This myopic approach to contextual evaluation
strengthened the Court's initial determination that a presumption against
extraterritoriality, as it pertains to Section 806, remained in force; and that
Congress had not evinced a clear intent to rebut that presumption.
In keeping with this method of internal contextual comparison, the
Court then refers to the other whistleblower provision found in SarbanesOxley. 89 Though the Court continues to mistakenly value the more immediate
context of Section 806 over the broader circumstances surrounding the Act
itself, comparison with a similar provision does seem a worthwhile
investigation. Section 110790 provides criminal sanctions for retaliation against
anyone giving truthful information to law enforcement officers relating to the
commission of any federal offense. 91 A subsection of that92provision expressly
provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over such offenses.
The Court reasons as follows: "That Congress provided for
extraterritorial reach as to Section 1107 but did not do so as to Section 806
conveys the implications that Congress did not mean Section 806 to have
extraterritorial effect., 93 Though this conclusion does have an appreciable logic,

public accounting firm from the Act.).
89 Id. (this perceived failure of Congress to specifically acknowledge difficulties inherent in
extraterritorial enforcement also plays an important role in the Court's conclusion that the
Department of Labor's enforcement role is indicative of Congress's intent to limit Section 806 to
domestic application.).
" Id. at 10.
90 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2007).
91 Id.

92 Carnero,433 F.3d at 10.
93 Id. at 10-11(citing Russello v. United States, 464 US 16, 23 (1983) ("Where Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
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its appropriateness here is undercut both by persuasive legal precedent, and by
practical considerations of context.
In United States v. Corey, the Court of Appeals for the 9h Circuit
resoundingly rejected the notion that express statutory language, providing for
the extraterritorial application of one provision, means that other provisions of
the same act are intended, by Congress, to be without such application.94 The
question of whether or not Congress enacted the statute with extraterritorial
concerns in mind is the vital consideration, and one which cannot be ascertained
simply by looking to the express language of other provisions similarly situated
to the one at issue. 95
Furthermore, it is important to take the practical circumstances
surrounding Section 806 (and Sarbanes-Oxley) into just consideration. As the
Carnero court points out, "the Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself is a major piece of
legislation bundling together a large number of diverse and independent
statutes, all designed to improve the quality of, and transparency in, financial
reporting and auditing of public companies." 96 The scandals that precipitated
legislation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were both unexpected, and seriously
harmful to the American economy. Congress properly decided to act quickly,
and boldly, in drafting a comprehensive series of laws that would counter the
threat, and provide redress, in the event of similar corporate deceit in the future.
Had the Carnero court placed proper emphasis on the broader
contextual elements surrounding Section 806, it would have determined, not
only that the statute is part of an encompassing protectionist Act, but also, that it
was drafted in some haste- in the hope of providing immediate shelter from
impending financial scandals. In fact, the Carnero court seems to have
uncovered tangible evidence of the expeditious manner in which SarbanesOxley was composed. In footnote 9 of the decision, the Court points out that "it
appears that through a drafting error, Congress enacted two subsections (e)."
Yet, this observation, and the statutory circumstance it tends to evince, is given
no value in the Court's contextual consideration of Section 806.
In its brief departure from the textual confines of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the Carnero court considers the manner in which Section 806 would be

generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.")).
94Corey, 232 F.3d at 1176 (rejecting the holding in United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.
NY 2000) where the Court concluded "that if Congress wanted to extend the jurisdiction of the
federal courts beyond the borders of the collective states, it had to express its intent in each relevant
subsection. ('[S]ubsections like § 7(7) confirm that Congress knows how to legislate
extraterritorially when it so desires.'). We see no reason to impose such a burden on Congress.).
95id.
96Carnero,433 F.3d at 9.
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practically enforced, if applied abroad. It raises the concern that "if the
whistleblower protection provision is given extraterritorial reach in a case like
the present one, it would empower U.S. courts and a U.S. agency, the DOL, to
delve into the employment relationship between foreign employers and their
foreign employees. 97 Further, the court notes that "in enacting other laws that
affect employment relationships extraterritorially, members of Congress have
recognized 'the well-established principle of sovereignty... that no nation has
the right to impose its labor standards on another country.' 98 The Court found
that if Section 806 had been intended, by Congress, to apply abroad, "it would
have said so; and certainly would have considered, before enacting the law, the
problems and limits of extraterritorial enforcement." 99
This concern, that Congress understands the enforcement of domestic
labor laws abroad to constitute a threat to the sovereignty of foreign nations,
and that it would have expressly dealt with those concerns if it had intended to
apply Section 806 abroad, is simply a restatement of the rationale behind the
Foley-presumption. The impropriety of that presumption, as applied to the
Carnero case, has already been explicated. Furthermore, the Court's
apprehension regarding the lack of any explicit acknowledgement of the
concern, by Congress, is given undue value. Had Congress explicitly dealt with
the territorial scope of Section 806, the whole process of interpretation would
essentially be rendered moot. The fact that it did not, represents to the Court an
intention to limit its application domestically. This line of reasoning betrays the
Court's failure to move beyond the Foley-presumption and objectively consider
contextual circumstances that evince an "appearance of contrary intent."
This latter inquiry is an essential part of the rule set forth in Foley, and
one upon which the presumption itself depends. The contextual investigation of
contrary intent must be engaged separately from the presumption it would
eviscerate. Thus, the Court ought to have framed the issue as follows:' 00 had
Congress considered extraterritorial application of Section 806, given the
context in which the law was passed, what would its conclusion have been?
Such a consideration would have probably revealed "contrary intent"- the
search for which was the very purpose of the Court's investigation of statutory
context.
Finally, the Court explores the relevance of Congress's decision to put

9'

id. at

15.

98 Id. at 15 (citing S. REP. No. 98-467, at 27-28 (1984)).

99Id.
'0oAs this note has already posited, the rule set forth in Foley was not appropriately applied to
Carnero in the first place, and since the Court decided to apply Foley, it "ought" to have applied it
properly.
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the DOL in charge of enforcing Section 806. It concludes that "further
suggestive of Congress's lack of extraterritorial intent is its failure to provide
any mechanism for enforcing the whistleblower protections in a foreign
setting. 10 1 Congress did not grant, or even discuss the granting of,
extraterritorial investigatory powers to ' 1the
DOL, the agency charged with
02
administering whistleblower complaints."
The idea that the DOL is a domestic agency 10 3 and that it has not been
equipped with additional tools the Court perceives as necessary to do its job
abroad, suggests to the Court that Congress did not expect the DOL to
encounter the problem of extraterritorial application. The Court properly points
out that the DOL has not been statutorily provided with interpreters, or with
coordination procedures involving the Department of State.104 Furthermore, the
Court finds it significant that the DOL has only been given sixty days to
complete its investigation and to issue findings under the procedure mandated
by 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(A).' 15 For the Court, "this short time frame seems
10 6
unrealistic if the DOL were expected to conduct investigations overseas."'
Moreover, the Court notes that if given extraterritorial scope, the "broad
coverage [of the statute] would create an expansive class of potential
whistleblowers by extending its protections to countless employees in countless
areas around the world.' 1 7 The lack of any statutory provisions providing the
DOL with a means of handling 0 this
increased administrative and logistical
8
burden is, to the Court, "striking."'
The aforementioned considerations regarding the DOL and the

'o' Carnero, 433 F.3d at 15.
102 id.
103

Id. at 15 n.13 (acknowledging that "the DOL has been charged with administering whistleblower

complaints in a variety of employment contexts, even where another agency, having the technical
expertise in the subject area of the complaints (such as the SEC here), has overall control." This
shows that, on occasion, Congress will use the DOL as a means of administering laws that are not
essentially about employment. This is one of those circumstances. The Court's failure to appreciate
that the DOL is here enforcing a law pertaining to market security, and not labor values, is
responsible for its misplaced Foley-presumption).
'o' Id. at 15.
'0' Id. at 15-16 (noting the following statutory language: "Not later than 60 days after the date of
receipt of a complaint ... and after affording the person named in the complaint an opportunity to
submit to the Secretary of Labor a written response to the complaint and an opportunity to meet
with a representative of the Secretary to present statements from witnesses, the Secretary of Labor
shall conduct an investigation and determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the
complaint has merit...").
'06 Camero, 433 F.3d at 15.
'07 Id. at 16.
log Id.
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practical context of its enforcement duties pertaining to Section 806, is a
legitimate interpretive exercise. Here, the Court seems to have finally put the
Foley-presumption aside, and considered contextual evidence of intent,
objectively. However, even though the Court's concern with the DOL's
inability to get their job done abroad may be well-founded, Congress's failure to
address the issue is not strongly indicative of its intention to limit Section 806
domestically.
Certainly, whatever intention is revealed by Congress's failure to
provide practical measures of enforcement to the DOL, is dwarfed by the other
contextual consideration surrounding the statute. The enormous scope of
Sarbanes-Oxley itself (in terms of both statutory volume and to whom its
regulatory procedures apply), Congress's express acknowledgement that
whistleblower protection provisions are a necessary means of revealing
transgressions against the Act's provisions, and the expeditious manner in
which the Act was enacted are contextual considerations that, when taken
together, evince a congressional intent to apply Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley
extraterritorially. Such a conclusion is not offset by a perceived failure of
Congress to provide for practical challenges that may or may not confront the
DOL upon executing its statutory responsibilities. The theoretical possibility
that the DOL would be unable to properly do its job is simply not, in itself,
convincing evidence that it was never assigned the job in the first place.
The Court has essentially posited that if it were a legislative body, and
it intended to apply Section 806 abroad, it would have addressed concerns that
Congress did not. But, the Court is not a legislative body; and it should not
place too much emphasis on what it concludes would be imprudence on the part
of Congress. When the other contextual indicia are considered, what the Court
perceives as intent to limit Section 806 domestically seems more likely to be
legislative oversight.
CITING CARNERO
The First Circuit's holding in Camero has already begun to safeguard
potentially fraudulent financial operations abroad, and in so doing, undermine
the security of American market integrity. On August 1, 2006, Thomas Beck
("Beck"), formerly of Citigroup, Inc., was denied whistleblower protection
under Section 806.109 His claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor. 110 The decision relied heavily on Carnero and the

'09 Beck v. Citigroup, Inc., Case No. 2006-SOX-00003 (U.S. Dept. of Labor Aug. 1, 2006),
http://www.hrpolicy.org/downloads/2006/DOL_2006-SOX-00003_080106.pdf.
110Id.
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rationale contained therein."'
Beck was a German national employed as an investment banker by a
subsidiary1 12 of Citigroup, Inc. He worked in the global mergers and
acquisitions business." 3 Though based in Frankfurt, the nature of Beck's
employment required him to travel regularly to the United States, and
communicate daily with Citigroup's New York headquarters.1 4 Approximately
60% of his business was generated outside
of Germany, and his compensation
5
included stock options in Citigroup, Inc."
On or about February 1, 2005, Beck began providing Citigroup
executives with information regarding what he reasonably believed to be his
company's fraudulent business practices." 6 On March 9, 2005, (the day before
Beck was scheduled to meet with Citigroup's head of European Investments, to
report his concerns) he was abruptly terminated." 7 The decision to discharge
him was made, or ratified, by officials of Citigroup, Inc. located in New
York." 8
As the world's largest company," 9 the operations of Citigroup, Inc.,
both domestically and abroad, may have a more substantial impact on the
American marketplace than any other single publicly traded entity. This is a
corporation, traded publicly on our domestic exchanges, that generates billions
of dollars in revenue abroad. As such, Citigroup, Inc. provides an ideal example
of a multinational corporation whose global business operations have
substantial market effects at home. Yet, the holding in Carnero, Beck and the
progeny sure to follow, drastically hinders the U.S.'s ability to scrutinize those
operations- a hindrance that compromises the very spirit of the SarbanesOxley Act.
Congress has clearly recognized that whistleblower protection is an
I11
Id.
112Id. (The Citigroup subsidiary, Citigroup Global Markets Deutschland AG & Co. KGaA)
113

Id.

14 Beck v. Citigroup, Inc., Case No. 2006-SOX-00003 (U.S. Dept. of Labor Aug. 1, 2006),
http://www.hrpolicy.org/downloads/2006/DOL 2006-SOX-00003_080106.pdf.
115 Id.
116 Id. (stating that the alleged violations included (1) misrepresentations of projected revenues of

Citigroup, Inc.'s German investment banking business; (2) misrepresentations by certain senior
employees of their credentials and employment histories; (3) misrepresentations concerning the
value of a German company to a client based in the United States who was considering it as a
potential acquisition; and (4) fraudulent attempts to obtain investment banking business and mislead
investors by inflating Citigroup, Inc.'s market position.)
117 id.
118

Id.

119Scott DeCarlo, The World's 2000 Largest Public Companies, FORBES, March 30, 2006,
available at http://www.forbes.comi2006/03/29/06f2k-worlds-largest-public-companies-land.html.
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120
important mechanism for bringing fraudulent business practices to light.
Given the significant effect that such practices abroad would likely have upon
our domestic marketplace, it is illogical to suppose that Congress intended to
deprive foreign whistleblowers of protection.

DANGEROUS POLICY REPERCUSSIONS
Ruben Carnero argued that limiting the protection afforded by the
whistleblower statute, improperly insulates the foreign operations of companies
subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 12' In so doing, the basic purpose of the
Act-to protect the integrity of U.S. securities markets and the interests of
investors therein- is frustrated.1 22 The large corporations to whom SarbanesOxley applies conduct a great deal of business abroad that substantially affects
the American marketplace. 123 Indeed, there is evidence that such foreign
operation has already increased in response to the demands of SarbanesOxley. 124 Failure to extend whistleblower protection to those employed in these
operations, is likely to stifle their willingness to come forward and report
accounting improprieties.
The global presence of multinational corporations, such as the
Defendant in Carnero, is profound-as is the effect their foreign operations
have on the American investor. 125 It is the duty of our judicial system, and our
citizenry, to protect the foreign employee who has the courage to risk his job for
our financial security.
Camero correctly pointed out that a failure to interpret Section 806 of
Sarbanes-Oxley to have extraterritorial application, wrongfully insulates the
foreign operations of corporations- and is contrary to the over-arching purpose
of Sarbanes-Oxley itself. The Court underappreciated the significance of this
point.
The financial burden of complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley reporting
provisions is substantial.12 6 Indeed, that burden has already proved too great for
many publicly traded companies. 12 7 These corporations, both foreign and

120

121

Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 484.
Carnero,433 F.3d at 7.

122 Id.
123 Maria

Camilla Cardilli, Regulation Without Borders: The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on

European Companies, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 785 (2004).

124See Silvia Ascarelli, Citing Sarbanes, Foreign Companies Flee U.S. Exchanges, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Sept. 20, 2004, at C1.
125 Gibeaut, supra note 65.
126 Ascarelli,
127

supra note 124.

Id.
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domestic, which had formerly listed securities on American exchanges, have
been forced to delist as a result of an inability to make compliance economically
viable. 28 The companies that have been able to shoulder the fiscal load of
Sarbanes-Oxley, must compensate for the monetary loss they endure. The oftencheaper operational environments of South America, India, and other
developing areas have already fueled an enormous surge in outsourcing and
relocation. In an effort to maximize profits, domestic corporations are leaving
the United States- taking the jobs and money they provide our economy with
them. The policy repercussions of the Carnero decision will be to encourage
this domestically-injurious process.
The Carneroholding will serve to dissuade potential whistleblowers,
employed abroad, from stepping forward and reporting their employers' fraud.
The financial liability these companies carry, pertaining to such fraud, is
enormous; and they will inevitably seek to protect themselves from it by all
available means. So, as progressions in education, communication,
transportation and international law all make corporate operation abroad an
increasingly desirable business option, the Carnerocourt has added yet another
element to the lure of foreign operation. One which, when coupled with the
monetary loss necessarily incurred through compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley
itself, is sure to be actively considered by executives.
CONCLUSION
In Carnero, the Court begins by incorrectly applying the legal
precedent set forth in Foley, as it fails to appreciate that Section 806 is a law
that "involves concerns that are not inherently domestic;" and is therefore not
subject to the presumption against extraterritorial application. Furthermore,
upon applying the interpretive method set forth in Foley, the Court fails to
properly uncover "contrary intent," by engaging in a contextual investigation
that remains influenced by the presumption and which fails to adequately value
the context of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The result is a decision that, on its face,
reeks of injustice- and which is likely to bring about undesirable repercussions
in our domestic economy.
Ruben Carnero did us a service when he stepped forward and reported
what he thought to be the fraudulent business practices of his employer. He
risked (and eventually lost) his job for the security of our domestic markets and
the financial welfare of its investors. Though Congress meant to protect
Carnero, and to encourage his actions, our Court turned its back on him. Seeing
the lack of appreciation our judiciary has shown for whistleblowers like Ruben

128

id.
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Carnero, what foreign employee will now step forward and risk their livelihood
for our protection?
We are living in a world where transnational fraud is more common
than it ever has been in the past. 129 Until the Courts extend Section 806
whistleblower protection extraterritorially, the efforts of Congress to protect
America from the damage such fraud can do, will be undermined.

129 Gibeaut,

supra note 65.
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ANDREW CITRON, B.A., M.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
RONALD J. COLOMBO, B.S., J.D., Associate Professorof Law
NORA DEMLEITNER, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Interim Dean and Professor of Law
DAVID ARTHUR DIAMOND, JR., A.B., LL.B., LL.M., Professorof Law
J. HERBIE DIFONZO, B.S., J.D., M.A., PH.D., Professor of Law and Director,
LL.M. in Family Law Program
JANET L. DOLGIN, B.A., M.A., PH.D., J.D., Jack and FredaDicker
DistinguishedProfessor of Health Care Law
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ERIC M. FREEDMAN, B.A., J.D., M.A., Maurice A. Deane Distinguished
Professorof ConstitutionalLaw
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, A.B., LL.B., LL.M., Professor of Law
LEON FRIEDMAN, A.B., LL.B., Joseph Kushner DistinguishedProfessorof Civil
Liberties Law
ScoTT FRUEHWALD, B.A., J.D, M.A., Ph.D., LL.M., S.J.D., Professorof Legal
Research and Writing
LINDA GALLER, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
MITCHELL GANS, B.B.A., J.D., Steven A. Horowitz DistinguishedProfessor of
Tax Law
ELIZABETH M. GLAZER, B.A., M.A., J.D., Associate Professorof Law
ASTRID GLOADE, B.A., J.D., Directorof Academic Support Programs
GLENDA GRACE, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professorof Law
DANIEL J.H. GREENWOOD, A.B., J.D., Visiting Professor of Law
JOHN DEWITT GREGORY, B.A., J.D., Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished
Professorof Family Law
JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, B.A., J.D., Professorof Law & Associate Deanfor
Faculty Development
FRANK GuLINO, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professorof Legal Research and
Writing
EMANUEL B. HALPER, B.A., J.D., DistinguishedScholar-in-Residence and
Visiting Professor of Law
GRANT M. HAYDEN, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor of Law
JAMES E. HICKEY, JR., B.S., J.D., Ph.D., Directorof Internationaland
ComparativeLaw Programsand Professorof Law
BERNARD E. JACOB, B.A., J.D., Ph.D., Alexander M. Bickel Distinguished
Professor of Communications Law
SUSAN H. JOFFE, B.A., M.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Legal
Research and Writing
LAWRENCE W. KESSLER, B.A., J.D., RichardJ. CardaliDistinguished
Professorof Trial Advocacy
STEFAN KRIEGER, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law and Directorof Hofstra Clinical
Programs
JULIAN KU, B.A., J.D., Associate Professorof Law
ERIC LANE, B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M., EricJ. Schmertz DistinguishedProfessor
of Public Law and Public Service
MARCIA LEVY, B.S., J.D., Assistant Deanfor Skills Programsand Clinical
Professorof Law
LISA LEWIS, B.A., J.D., M.A., Visiting Assistant Professorof Law
THEO LIEBMANN, B.A., J.D., ClinicalProfessorand Attorney-In-Charge of
Hofstra Child Advocacy Clinic
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BARBARA A. LUKEMAN, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professorof Legal Research and
Writing
MALACHY T. MAHON, B.A., J.D., Siggi B. Wilzig DistinguishedProfessorof
Banking Law
SERGE MARTINEZ, B.A., J.D., Associate ClinicalProfessorof Law
LINDA C. MCCLAIN, A.B., A.M., J.D., LL.M., Rivkin Radler Distinguished
Professorof Law
KEVIN McELRoY, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Legal Research
and Writing
JOELLE ANNE MORENO, B.A., J.D., Visiting Professorof Law
MARK L. MOVSESIAN, A.B., J.D., Professorof Law
JONATHAN NASH, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Visiting Professorof Law
RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., B.A., Dipl., J.D., LL.M., Professorof Law
ASHIRA OSTROW, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
ELISABETH A. PALLADINO, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professorof Legal
Research and Writing
CURTIS PEW, B.A., M.P.P.A., J.D., Associate Clinical Professorand Attorney
in-Charge,Securities Arbitration Clinic
ALAN N. RESNICK, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professorof Bankruptcy Law
REZA REZVANI, B.A., J.D., Visiting ClinicalProfessorof Law
SIDNEY A. ROSENZWEIG, SC.B., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professorof Law
ANDREW SCHEPARD, B.A., M.A., J.D., Directorof the Centerfor Children,
Families and the Law and Professorof Law
NORMAN I. SILBER, B.A., M.A., PH.D., J.D., Professorof Law
RONALD H. SILVERMAN, B.A., J.D., Peter S. Kalikow DistinguishedProfessor
of Real Estate Law
ROY D. SIMON, JR., B.A., J.D., HowardLichtenstein DistinguishedProfessorof
Legal Ethics
MICHAEL SMITH, B.A., B.A., J.D., Visiting Professorof Law
LISA A. SPAR, B.A., J.D., M.S., Acting Directorof the Law Library
LILLIAN SPIESS, B.A., M.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professorof Law
BARBARA STARK, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professorof Law
AMY R. STEIN, B.A., J.D., Professorof Legal Research and Writing, Assistant
Deanfor Adjunct Instruction, and Coordinatorof the Legal Writing
Program
KATHRYN STEIN, B.A., J.D., Associate ClinicalProfessorand Attorney-in
Charge, CriminalJustice Clinic
ROBERT S. THALER, B.A., J.D., M.A., Visiting Assistant ClinicalProfessorand
Attorney-in-Charge,Mediation Clinic
MARSHALL E. TRACHT, B.A., J.D., M.B.A., Professor of Law
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AARON TWERSKI, A.B., B.S., J.D., Professor of Law
CHRISTINE C. VERITY, B.S., J.D., Visiting Professor of Legal Research and
Writing
VERN R. WALKER, B.A., M.A., PH.D., J.D., Professor of Law
JOEL WEINTRAUB, A.B., M.D., J.D., Special Professorof Law Associate
Directorof Health Law Studies
LAURIS WREN, B.A., J.D., Associate ClinicalProfessorand Attorney-in-Charge
of the PoliticalAsylum Clinic
MICHELLE M. Wu, B.A., J.D., M. LiBR., Interim Senior Vice Deanfor Academic
Affairs and Professor of Law
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FRANK

G. ZARB SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

Administrators and Faculty
Spring 2007
OFFICE OF THE DEAN
SALVATORE SODANO, M.B.A., Dean
ANIL MATHUR, PH.D., Associate Dean, Business Professor,Marketing &

InternationalBusiness
ROSE ANNE MANFREDI, M.A., Executive Assistant Deanfor Administration
MARIA C. MCCAREY, B.A., Directorof UndergraduateBusiness Advisement
BRIAN CALIGIURE, M.B.A., InstructionalTechnologist, Technical Director,

Trading Room
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS

Graduate Programs Office, Frank G. Zarb School of Business
STUART BASS, J.D., Director of GraduatePrograms,Professor,Accounting,
Taxation and Legal Studies in Business
LISA WELCH, B.A., Associate Directorof Graduate Programs
LUKE C. NG, M.B.A., Directorof Recruitmentfor Graduate Business Programs
Graduate Business Career Services at The Career Center
BARBARA CHURCH-KATTAN, M.ED., Directorof GraduateBusiness Career
Services
LISA KELLERMAN, M.S. ED., Assistant Directorof Graduate Business Career
Services
FACULTY

Department of Accounting, Taxation and Legal Studies in Business
ANTHONY BASILE, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal
Studies in Business
JACQUELINE BURKE, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Accounting, Taxation and
Legal Studies in Business
ROBERT FONFEDER, PH.D., Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal Studies
in Business
RICHARD JONES, PH.D., Associate Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal
Studies in Business
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ROBERT KATZ, L.L.M., Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal Studies in
Business, Chaikin DistinguishedTeaching Professor
CHERYL LEHMAN, PH.D., Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal Studies in
Business
VICTOR LOPEZ, J.D., Associate Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal
Studies in Business
EUGENE MACCARRONE, J.D., Associate Professor,Accounting, Taxation and
Legal Studies in Business
DOMINIC MARSICOVETERE, M.B.A., DepartmentAdministrator,Accounting,
Taxation and Legal Studies in Business
SUSAN MARTIN, J.D., Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal Studies in
Business, Cypres Family DistinguishedProfessor in Legal Studies in
Business
STEVEN PETRA, PH.D., Associate Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal
Studies in Business
RALPH POLIMENI, PH.D., Vice Provostfor Accreditation and Assessment
Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal Studies in Business,
Chaykin Endowed Chairin Accounting
NATHAN SLAVIN, PH.D., Associate Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal
Studies in Business
ELIZABETH VENUTI, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Accounting, Taxation and
Legal Studies in Business
GLEN VOGEL, J.D., Assistant Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal Studies
in Business
PAUL WARNER, PH.D., ChairProfessor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal
Studies in Business
MARTHA WEISEL, J.D., Associate Professor,Accounting, Taxation and Legal
Studies in Business
Business Computer Information Systems & Quantitative Methods
JOHN AFFISCO, PH.D.,ChairProfessor,Business Computer Information Systems
& QuantitativeMethods
LINDA SCHAIN, M.B.A., Assistant Chair,Business Computer Information
Systems & QuantitativeMethods
MERAL BINBASIOGLU, PH.D., Professor,Business Computer Information
Systems & QuantitativeMethods
MAHESH CHANDRA, D.Sc., Associate Professor,Business ComputerInformation
Systems & QuantitativeMethods
STEVEN COSARES, PH.D., Associate Professor,Business Computer Information
Systems & QuantitativeMethods
BERNARD DICKMAN, PH.D., Associate Professor,Business Computer
Information Systems & QuantitativeMethods
FARROKH GUTAHI, PH.D., Associate Professor,Business ComputerInformation
Systems & QuantitativeMethods

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

29

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 9

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

Special Assistant Professor,Business Computer
Information Systems & QuantitativeMethods
ESTHER KLEIN, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Business Computer Information
Systems & Quantitative Methods
LAURA LALLY, PH.D., Associate Professor,Business Computer Information
Systems & Quantitative Methods
FARROKH NASRI, PH.D., Professor,Business Computer Information Systems &
Quantitative Methods
M. JAVAD PAKNEJAD, PH.D., Professor,Business Computer Information
Systems & QuantitativeMethods
NAJIB SAYLANI, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Business Computer Information
Systems & Quantitative Methods
DAVID SESSIONS, PH.D., Associate Professor,Business ComputerInformation
Systems & QuantitativeMethods
DEB SLEDGIANOWSKI, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Business Computer
Information Systems & Quantitative Methods
KHALID SOLIMAN, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Business ComputerInformation
Systems & QuantitativeMethods
LONNIE STEVANS, PH.D., Associate Professor,Business Computer Information
Systems & QuantitativeMethods
MOHAMMED TAFTI, D.B.A., Professor,Business ComputerInformation Systems
& QuantitativeMethods
ELAINE WINSTON, PH.D., Associate Professor,Business Computer Information
Systems & QuantitativeMethods
JOHN HARDIMAN, P.D.,

Finance
GIOIA BALES, M.B.A., Instructor/Administrator,Coordinatorof the Merrill
Lynch Center
RAHUL BISHNOI, PH.D., Associate Professor,Finance
ROBERT CAMPBELL, PH.D., Associate Professor, Finance

A. SINAN CEBENOYAN, PH.D., Professor,Finance
AHMET KARAGOZOGLU, PH.D., Associate Professor,Finance
WI SAENG KIM, PH.D., Associate Professor,Finance
STEVEN KRULL, PH.D., Associate Professor,Finance
ESMERALDA LYN, PH.D., Professor,Finance, C.V Starr Distinguished

Professor in Financeand InternationalFinancialServices
Professor,Finance
GEORGE PAPAIOANNOU, PH.D., Professor,Finance, C.V StarrDistinguished
Professor in Financeand Investment Banking
ANOOP RAI, PH.D., Professor,Finance
ANDREW SPIELER, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Finance
EHSAN NIKBAKHT, D.B.A.,
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K. G. VISWANATHAN, PH.D., Associate Professor,Finance
NANCY WHITE, PH.D., ChairAssociate Professor,Finance
EDWARD ZYCHOWICZ, PH.D., Professor,Finance
Management, Entrepreneurship & General Business
MAURITZ BLONDER, PH.D., Associate Professor,Management,
Entrepreneurship& General Business
TUGBA CAYIRLI, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Management, Entrepreneurship&
General Business
BRUCE CHARNOV, PH.D., Associate Professor,Management, Entrepreneurship
& General Business
DEBRA COMER, PH.D., Professor,Management, Entrepreneurship& General
Business
MAMDOUH FARID, PH.D., ChairAssociate Professor,Management,
Entrepreneurship& General Business
DAVID FLYNN, PH.D., Professor,Management, Entrepreneurship& General
Business
LI-LIAN GAO, PH.D., Associate Professor,Management,Entrepreneurship&
General Business
WAYNE GROSSMAN, PH.D., AssistantProfessor,Management,
Entrepreneurship& General Business
RICHARD HAYES, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Management,Entrepreneurship&
General Business
HAROLD LAZARUS, PH.D., Professor,Management, Entrepreneurship&
General Business, The Mel Weitz DistinguishedProfessor of Business
JANET LENAGHAN, D.P.S., Assistant Professor,Management, Entrepreneurship
& General Business
KAUSHIK SENGUPTA, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Management,
Entrepreneurship& General Business
CHARLES SMITH, PH.D., Associate Professor,Management, Entrepreneurship&
General Business
MATTHEW SONFIELD, PH.D., Professor,Management, Entrepreneurship&
General Business, Robert F. Dall DistinguishedProfessorof Business
Marketing & International Business
BENNY BARAK, PH.D., ChairProfessor,Marketing & InternationalBusiness
BARRY BERMAN, PH.D., Directorof the EMBA Program,Professor,Marketing
& InternationalBusiness, Walter H. 'Bud' Miller DistinguishedProfessor
of Business
JOEL EVANS, PH.D., Professor,Marketing & InternationalBusiness, RMI
DistinguishedProfessor of Business
ANDREW FORMAN, PH.D., Associate Professor,Marketing & International
Business
JING Hu, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Marketing & InternationalBusiness
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WILLIAM JAMES, PH.D., Professor,Marketing & InternationalBusiness
SONGPOL KULVIWAT, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Marketing & International
Business
KEUN LEE, D.B.A., Associate Professor,Marketing & InternationalBusiness
CHARLES MCMELLON, PH.D., Associate Professor,Marketing & International
Business
RUSTY MAE MOORE, PH.D., Associate Professor,Marketing & International
Business
JAMES NEELANKAVIL, PH.D., Professor,Marketing & InternationalBusiness
ELAINE SHERMAN, PH.D., Professor,Marketing & InternationalBusiness
SHAwN THELEN, PH.D., Assistant Professor,Marketing & International
Business
BOONGHEE YOO, PH.D., Associate Professor,Marketing & International
Business
YONG ZHANG, PH.D., Associate Professor,Marketing & InternationalBusiness

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol6/iss1/9

32

